Hostile State Disinformation In The Internet Age
A new article from the Daedalus (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) Future of Free Speech Symposium. State-sponsored disinformation (SSD) aimed at other nations' populations is a tactic that has been used for millennia. But SSD powered by internet social media is a far more powerful tool than the U.S. government had, until recently, assumed. Such disinformation can erode trust in government, set societal groups—sometimes violently—against each other, prevent national unity, amplify deep political and social divisions, and lead people to take disruptive action in the real world. In part because of a realization of the power of SSD, legislators, government officials, corporate officials, media figures, and academics have begun debating what measures might be appropriate to reduce the destructive effects of...
Most of the proposed solutions have technical or practical difficulties, but more important, they may erode the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and expression. Foreign powers, however, do not have First Amendment rights. Therefore, in keeping with the Constitution, the U.S. government can act to counter SSD if it can establish clearly that the information is being disseminated by a state actor. If the government can act constitutionally against SSD, can it do so effectively? Or are new legal authorities required?
The federal government already has numerous legal tools to restrict activity in the United States by hostile nations. Some of those tools have recently been used to address hostile powers' malign "influence operations," including internet-powered disinformation. Nonetheless, SSD from several nations continues. Russia in particular runs a sophisticated campaign aimed at America's fissures that has the potential to greatly amplify divisions in this country, negatively affect public policy, and perhaps stimulate violence. Russia has created or amplified disinformation targeting U.S. audiences on such issues as the character of U.S.
presidential candidates, the efficacy of vaccines, Martin Luther King Jr., the legitimacy of international peace accords, and many other topics that vary from believable to the outlandish. While the topics and the social media messages may seem absurd to many Americans, they do gain traction with some—perhaps enough to make a difference. There is every reason to believe that Russian SSD had a significant influence on, for example, the United Kingdom's referendum on Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. But acting to block such SSD does risk spilling over into actions limiting citizens' constitutional rights. The Weaponization of Information: Disinformation’s Rise to Strategic Weapon
The digital age has ushered in a new era of warfare, one fought not with conventional weapons but with bytes of data and carefully crafted narratives. Disinformation, the deliberate spread of false or misleading information, has evolved from a mere nuisance into a potent weapon capable of destabilizing nations, manipulating public opinion, and undermining democratic institutions. The years 2024 and 2025 witnessed disinformation’s ascent to a full-fledged strategic tool, employed to interfere in elections, incite protests, sabotage diplomatic efforts, and even trigger geopolitical crises. Masquerading as legitimate journalism or expert analysis, disinformation seamlessly infiltrates the minds of millions, reshaping their perceptions of reality. Defining the Threat: International Consensus and Scope The international community has recognized the gravity of the disinformation threat, with organizations like the European Commission formulating concrete definitions.
Disinformation is distinguished from misinformation (false content spread unintentionally) and malinformation (true information weaponized out of context) by its deliberate intent to deceive and manipulate. The scale of the threat is staggering, with NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) reporting a dramatic surge in coordinated disinformation campaigns globally. These campaigns, often linked to state actors or sophisticated networks, target vulnerable regions like Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus, aiming to erode trust in governments, discredit elections, and inflame existing... NATO’s Findings and the Global Response: A Race for Digital Sovereignty The new EP Library Catalogue allows you to search the EP collection for: - Journals, books and articles in paper or electronic format
- EPRS and Policy Department publications Abstract: Foreign actors, particularly Russia and China, are using disinformation as a tool to sow doubts and counterfactuals within the U.S. population. This tactic is not new. From Nazi influence campaigns in the United States to the Soviets spreading lies about the origins of HIV, disinformation has been a powerful tool throughout history. The modern “information age” and the reach of the internet has only exacerbated the impact of these sophisticated campaigns.
What then can be done to limit the future effectiveness of the dissemination of foreign states’ disinformation? Who has the responsibility and where does the First Amendment draw the boundaries of jurisdiction? Abstract: Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations (CEIO) have garnered significant public, academic and policy interest. 126 million Americans were reportedly exposed to Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US election on Facebook. Indeed, to the extent that such efforts shape political outcomes, they may prove far more consequential than other, more flamboyant forms of cyber conflict. Importantly, CEIOs highlight the human dimension of cyber conflict.
Focused on ‘hacking human minds’ and affecting individuals behind keyboards, as opposed to hacking networked systems, CEIOs represent an emergent form of state cyber activity. Importantly, data for studying CEIOs are often publicly available. We employ semantic network analysis (SNA) to assess data seldom analyzed in cybersecurity research – the text of actual advertisements from a prominent CEIO. We examine the content, as well as the scope and scale of the Russian-orchestrated social media campaign. While often described as ‘disinformation,’ our analysis shows that the information utilized in the Russian CEIO was generally factually correct. Further, it appears that African Americans, not white conservatives, were the target demographic that Russia sought to influence.
We conclude with speculation, based on our findings, about the likely motives for the CEIO. Part of the book series: Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication ((SSMPC)) Democracies around the world face rising levels of disinformation. The intentional spread of falsehoods and related attacks on the rights of minorities, press freedoms, and the rule of law all challenge the basic norms and values on which institutional legitimacy and political stability... The many varieties of disinformation include: politicians lying about their policies and political activities, attacks on the scientific evidence surrounding important issues such as climate change, the spread of “deep state,” “globalist” and various... The sources of these claims include elected politicians, movement leaders, social media influencers, foreign governments, and political information sites that often use familiar journalistic formats to package propaganda.
Most of these efforts come from the radical right movements, parties and wealthy libertarian interests that oppose broad and inclusive democratic representation and the public interest protections of government. While this chapter focuses primarily on the United States, similar patterns can be found in many other democratic nations. This chapter first appeared in The Disinformation Age: Politics, Technology and Disruptive Communication in the United States (Bennett & Livingston eds., Cambridge University Press, 2021). The interdisciplinary workshops from which that volume emerged were sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and appeared in the SSRC “Anxieties of Democracy” series. We want to thank our colleagues at the Social Science Research Council, past and present, especially Kris-Stella Trump, Michael Miller, and Jason Rhody. This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout State-sponsored disinformation (SSD) aimed at other nations' populations is a tactic that has been used for millennia. But SSD powered by internet social media is a far more powerful tool than the U.S. government had, until recently, assumed. Such disinformation can erode trust in government, set societal groups—sometimes violently—against each other, prevent national unity, amplify deep political and social divisions, and lead people to take disruptive action in the real world. In part because of a realization of the power of SSD, legislators, government officials, corporate officials, media figures, and academics have begun debating what measures might be appropriate to reduce the destructive effects of...
Most of the proposed solutions have technical or practical difficulties, but more important, they may erode the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and expression. Foreign powers, however, do not have First Amendment rights. Therefore, in keeping with the Constitution, the U.S. government can act to counter SSD if it can establish clearly that the information is being disseminated by a state actor. If the government can act constitutionally against SSD, can it do so effectively? Or are new legal authorities required?
The federal government already has numerous legal tools to restrict activity in the United States by hostile nations. Some of those tools have recently been used to address hostile powers' malign "influence operations," including internet-powered disinformation. Nonetheless, SSD from several nations continues. Russia in particular runs a sophisticated campaign aimed at America's fissures that has the potential to greatly amplify divisions in this country, negatively affect public policy, and perhaps stimulate violence. Russia has created or amplified disinformation targeting U.S. audiences on such issues as the character of U.S.
presidential candidates, the efficacy of vaccines, Martin Luther King Jr., the legitimacy of international peace accords, and many other topics that vary from believable to the outlandish. While the topics and the social media messages may seem absurd to many Americans, they do gain traction with some—perhaps enough to make a difference. There is every reason to believe that Russian SSD had a significant influence on, for example, the United Kingdom's referendum on Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. But acting to block such SSD does risk spilling over into actions limiting citizens' constitutional rights. The effectiveness of internet-powered, hostile foreign government disinformation, used as part of "influence operations" or "hybrid war," stems in part from the facts that the foreign role is usually well hidden, the damage done...
Historically, allegations of "foreign ties" have been used to justify suppression of Americans dissenting from wars and other government international activities. Thus, government sanctions against SSD, such as regulation of the content of social media, should be carefully monitored for abuse and should be directed at the state sponsor, not the witting or unwitting citizen. Subodh Mishra is Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS ESG memorandum by Avleen Kaur, Corporate Ratings Research Sector Head for Technology, Media, and Telecommunications, at ISS ESG. In an era of rapidly evolving digital technologies, information integrity has become a growing concern. Current threats include “misinformation,” defined as inaccurate information shared without the intent to cause harm; and “disinformation,” inaccurate information deliberately disseminated with the purpose of deceiving audiences and doing harm.
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2025, survey respondents identified misinformation and disinformation as leading global risks. Moreover, misinformation and disinformation can interact with and be exacerbated by other technological and societal factors, such as the rise of AI-generated content. This post examines some contemporary online risks, including problems highlighted by ISS ESG Screening & Controversies data. Additional data from the ISS ESG Corporate Rating offer insight into how companies in the Interactive Media and Online Communications industry are responding to such risks. The post also reviews evolving regulation that is shaping the digital landscape and the response to misinformation, disinformation, and related threats. With an estimated two-thirds of the global population having an online presence, the majority of whom are also social media users, the number of people such content might reach has also expanded significantly.
People Also Search
- Hostile State Disinformation in the Internet Age - MIT Press
- Hostile State Disinformation in the Internet Age - JSTOR
- Journal of Free Speech Law: "Hostile State Disinformation in the ...
- Disinformation: The Deadliest Weapon of the Digital Age | DISA
- LibGuides: Foreign Interference Including Disinformation: E-articles ...
- A Brief History of the Disinformation Age: Information Wars and the ...
- Journal of Free Speech Law: "Hostile State… - inkl
- Misinformation and Disinformation in the Digital Age: A Rising Risk for ...
- 6 - How Digital Disinformation Turned Dangerous
A New Article From The Daedalus (Journal Of The American
A new article from the Daedalus (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) Future of Free Speech Symposium. State-sponsored disinformation (SSD) aimed at other nations' populations is a tactic that has been used for millennia. But SSD powered by internet social media is a far more powerful tool than the U.S. government had, until recently, assumed. Such disinformation can erode trust i...
Most Of The Proposed Solutions Have Technical Or Practical Difficulties,
Most of the proposed solutions have technical or practical difficulties, but more important, they may erode the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and expression. Foreign powers, however, do not have First Amendment rights. Therefore, in keeping with the Constitution, the U.S. government can act to counter SSD if it can establish clearly that the information is being disseminated by a stat...
The Federal Government Already Has Numerous Legal Tools To Restrict
The federal government already has numerous legal tools to restrict activity in the United States by hostile nations. Some of those tools have recently been used to address hostile powers' malign "influence operations," including internet-powered disinformation. Nonetheless, SSD from several nations continues. Russia in particular runs a sophisticated campaign aimed at America's fissures that has ...
Presidential Candidates, The Efficacy Of Vaccines, Martin Luther King Jr.,
presidential candidates, the efficacy of vaccines, Martin Luther King Jr., the legitimacy of international peace accords, and many other topics that vary from believable to the outlandish. While the topics and the social media messages may seem absurd to many Americans, they do gain traction with some—perhaps enough to make a difference. There is every reason to believe that Russian SSD had a sign...
The Digital Age Has Ushered In A New Era Of
The digital age has ushered in a new era of warfare, one fought not with conventional weapons but with bytes of data and carefully crafted narratives. Disinformation, the deliberate spread of false or misleading information, has evolved from a mere nuisance into a potent weapon capable of destabilizing nations, manipulating public opinion, and undermining democratic institutions. The years 2024 an...