Disinformation Foreign Disinformation Social Media Homeland

As U.S. adversaries are aligning their disinformation narratives, America’s choice to unilaterally disarm places its citizens at risk. To address this vulnerability, the U.S. should pre-emptively counter false narratives and build its collective cognitive defenses. Read More The American Security Project (ASP) is proud to announce the appointment of three distinguished leaders to its Board of Directors.

Read More Disinformation’s Infiltration into American Politics: A Year-Long Investigation A comprehensive year-long investigation conducted by NBC News correspondent Brandy Zadrozny has revealed the alarming extent to which foreign disinformation campaigns penetrate the American mainstream media landscape, potentially influencing voter decisions and undermining democratic... The report exposes the intricate methods employed by foreign actors to spread misleading narratives and manipulate public opinion, raising serious concerns about the integrity of information consumed by Americans. The Mechanics of Disinformation Dissemination Zadrozny’s in-depth analysis uncovers the sophisticated strategies utilized by foreign entities to inject disinformation into the American information ecosystem.

These tactics often involve leveraging social media platforms, creating and disseminating fabricated news articles, and exploiting existing political divisions to amplify their messages. The investigation also reveals the role of unwitting individuals and groups in inadvertently spreading disinformation, highlighting the complex and multifaceted nature of the challenge. By meticulously tracing the origins and dissemination pathways of disinformation, the report provides crucial insights into how these narratives gain traction and influence public discourse. Impact on Voter Behavior and Electoral Integrity Most democracies today are case studies on the rise of populism and illustrate extreme fragmentation on several grounds, such as ethnicity, religion, caste, and immigration (Boulianne et al., 2020; Gonawela et al., 2018; Yu... The anti-vaxxer movement (Lovari et al., 2021), the storming of the US Capitol (Munn, 2021), and the Red Fort violence in India (Waghre, 2021) are some real-world events that illustrate both the widening divide...

Notably, whether it be a social, economic, scientific, political, or cultural issue, the rot permeates across the spectrum (Barberá et al., 2015). Table 5 provides the results for indirect relationships. In line with past studies (e.g., Arayankalam & Krishnan, 2021; Hair et al., 2020; Zollo et al., 2020), we tested two mediation hypotheses and a serial mediation. DT was found to have a positive and significant relationship with KH mediated through mattering (H3: β = 0.273; p < 0.001). Foreign actors, particularly Russia and China, are using disinformation as a tool to sow doubts and counterfactuals within the U.S. population.

This tactic is not new. From Nazi influence campaigns in the United States to the Soviets spreading lies about the origins of HIV, disinformation has been a powerful tool throughout history. The modern “information age” and the reach of the internet has only exacerbated the impact of these sophisticated campaigns. What then can be done to limit the future effectiveness of the dissemination of foreign states’ disinformation? Who has the responsibility and where does the First Amendment draw the boundaries of jurisdiction? Richard A.

Clarke is the CEO of Good Harbor Security Risk Management, a cyber­security consultancy, and former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Middle East Institute. He worked for the State Department during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush appointed him to chair the Counter-­terrorism Security Group and to a seat on the United States National Security Council. In 1998, President Bill Clinton appointed him the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, and the chief counter-­terrorism adviser on the National Security Council.

Under President George W. Bush, Clarke served as Special Advisor to the President on cybersecurity. In 2013, Clarke served on an advisory group for the Obama administration as it sought to reform NSA spying programs following the revelations of documents released by Edward Snowden. Clarke is the author of ten books, including The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats (with Robert K. Knake, 2020), Warnings: Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes (with R. P.

Eddy, 2017), and Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (with Robert K. Knake, 2010). State-sponsored disinformation (SSD) aimed at other nations’ populations is a tactic that has been used for millennia. But SSD powered by internet social media is a far more powerful tool than the U.S. government had, until recently, assumed. Such disinformation can erode trust in government, set societal groups—sometimes violently—against each other, prevent national unity, amplify deep political and social divisions, and lead people to take disruptive action in the real world.

In part because of a realization of the power of SSD, legislators, government officials, corporate officials, media figures, and academics have begun debating what measures might be appropriate to reduce the destructive effects of... Most of the proposed solutions have technical or practical difficulties, but more important, they may erode the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and expression. Foreign powers, however, do not have First Amendment rights. Therefore, in keeping with the Constitution, the U.S. government can act to counter SSD if it can establish clearly that the information is being disseminated by a state actor. If the government can act constitutionally against SSD, can it do so effectively?

Or are new legal authorities required? The federal government already has numerous legal tools to restrict activity in the United States by hostile nations. Some of those tools have recently been used to address hostile powers’ malign “influence operations,” including internet-powered disinformation. Nonetheless, SSD from several nations continues. Russia in particular runs a sophisticated campaign aimed at America’s fissures that has the potential to greatly amplify divisions in this country, negatively affect public policy, and perhaps stimulate violence.1

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