The Battle For Truth How European Nations Are Fighting Disinformation

Bonisiwe Shabane

-Dec 5, 2025, 10:26 PM

the battle for truth how european nations are fighting disinformation

Public Education Forum a NAFO Initiative Imagine this: A parent scrolling through social media comes across a post claiming that a new law will force children to receive an experimental vaccine without parental consent. Outraged, they share the post. It spreads like wildfire, stoking fear and anger—except, the claim is completely false. This is how disinformation operates, influencing elections, public health, and trust in democratic institutions. Disinformation isn’t just a problem for politicians and journalists.

If It Weren’t for Those Meddling Europeans: The EU’s Battle Against Disinformation The digital age has ushered in an era of unprecedented information access, but this accessibility has a dark side: the proliferation of disinformation. False and misleading information, often spread with malicious intent, poses a significant threat to democratic processes, public health, and societal cohesion. The European Union, recognizing the gravity of this challenge, has taken a leading role in combating disinformation, implementing a multi-faceted strategy that combines regulation, industry collaboration, and support for independent fact-checking. This proactive approach has placed the EU at the forefront of the global fight against online manipulation, but it has also sparked controversy and debate about the balance between protecting citizens and safeguarding freedom... The EU’s concern over disinformation isn’t unfounded.

The rise of social media platforms has created echo chambers where misinformation can spread rapidly and unchecked. During the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum, foreign actors were accused of using disinformation campaigns to influence public opinion. Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic saw a surge in false information about the virus’s origins, treatments, and vaccines, undermining public health efforts and fueling social unrest. These events underscored the vulnerability of democracies to malicious information campaigns and highlighted the need for a robust response. The EU’s counter-disinformation strategy rests on several pillars. The Code of Practice on Disinformation, a self-regulatory framework signed by major online platforms, commits them to tackling disinformation through measures like demonetizing fake news websites, improving ad transparency, and empowering users to flag...

The European Commission also monitors the implementation of the Code and regularly assesses its effectiveness. Furthermore, the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) introduce new obligations for online platforms to combat disinformation, including greater transparency in their algorithms and content moderation practices. These regulations aim to hold tech giants accountable for the content hosted on their platforms and prevent the spread of harmful disinformation. Beyond regulation, the EU invests heavily in supporting independent fact-checkers and media literacy initiatives. Recognizing that informed citizens are the best defense against disinformation, the EU funds projects that promote critical thinking skills and help people identify and debunk false information. The European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force, for example, actively counters disinformation campaigns targeting Eastern European countries.

These initiatives aim to empower citizens to navigate the complex information landscape and make informed decisions, reducing their susceptibility to manipulation. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume 10, Article number: 657 (2023) Cite this article The COVID-19 health crisis and the invasion of Ukraine have placed disinformation in the focus of European policies. Our aim is to analyze the emerging European policy on counter-disinformation practices and regulations. To do this, we examine developing European Union (EU) strategy, against different forms of fake news, from a multidisciplinary approach that combines Journalism and Geopolitics. Our methodology is based on the critical analysis of documents generated by the EU on disinformation from 2018 to 2022, including reports, communications, statements and other legislative texts.

Our findings suggest that the EU’s policy against disinformation is based on two opposing logics that coexist and compete. The first is securitization, which understands this problem as a threat to democracy that legitimizes ‘exceptional decision-making’ from a hard power perspective. The second is based on the self-regulation and voluntarism of digital platforms with a clear orientation towards soft law and minimal intervention. The recent adoption of the Digital Services Act and the stronger regulation of online platforms do not replace this logic, since this legislation adopts a “co-regulatory framework”. The coexistence of these two logics generates internal contradictions and dissonance that can determine the future of European policies on this important topic and its chances of success. Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the European Union (EU) adopted a series of sanctions aimed at reducing Russia’s ability to wage war.

Whereas most were of an economic nature, measures suspending the airing in the EU of Russian government-controlled broadcasters, such as RT and Sputnik, were among the first EU reactions to the invasion. The rationale for these sanctions is that these broadcasters are sources of disinformation that are weaponized by the Kremlin: “Systematic information manipulation and disinformation by the Kremlin is applied as an operational tool in... It is also a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security.” (European Commission 2022) In doing so the EU took a further step, at least since the occupation of Crimea... Only one year earlier, in December 2020, the Commission took action on a different aspect of disinformation, the role of social media platforms in the spread and circulation of fake news, by including it... This represented a real innovation, as previously the EU had expected platforms to comply on a voluntary basis. The differences between these two regulatory elements show significant evolutions in the consideration of disinformation by the EU.

Firstly, despite the incomplete transnationalization of public spheres (Rivas-de-Roca and García-Gordillo 2022), the EU sees disinformation as a multifaceted transnational phenomenon. Its policy response has in different moments addressed classical international concerns –the so called weaponization of disinformation in asymmetric conflicts (Szostek 2020)– globalization asymmetries –with transnational companies potentially exploiting regulatory asymmetries and differences between... Secondly, disinformation is currently seen as a matter for regulatory intervention by the public sector, rather than an example of poor information supply that will be solved by the news market. As such, disinformation has experienced different ‘international response regimes’, going from the organization of international coalitions of professionals to counteract fake news, to its consideration as a security threat in the context of hybrid... The consideration of such responses is fertile ground for analysis, since the analyses of responses adopted by international actors is as instructive as the areas in which action does not take place. The combination of these approaches allows for analysis of the emerging international regime of the fight against disinformation.

We are the leading scholarly society concerned with the research and teaching of political science in Europe, headquartered in the UK with a global membership. Our groups and networks are pushing the boundaries of specialist sub-fields of political science, helping to nurture diversity and inclusivity across the discipline. This unique event has helped tens of thousands of scholars over nearly five decades hone research, grow networks and secure publishing contracts. An engaging platform for discussion, debate and thinking; Europe's largest annual gathering of political scientists from across the globe. A comprehensive programme of cutting-edge qualitative and quantitative methodological training delivered by experts. Phones buzzing, sun blazing and cameras everywhere.

Such was the day-to-day at the 2023 Global Media Forum (GMF) – Deutsche Welle’s annual event for journalists, politicians and civil society to meet and discuss the state of media across the globe. Located in the former West German capital Bonn, the two-day conference included a range of interesting panel discussions, networking opportunities, and, most importantly, an opportunity to finally meet the editorial team behind EU NEIGHBOURS... While I’m no stranger to conferences, least of all international ones, I knew from the start that the GMF would be different. Writing articles has always been something I have engaged in on the side while working in NGOs or political campaigns. Being surrounded by actual media professionals felt quite out of the ordinary, intimidating almost. After a night of luggage-related shenanigans on the way from the airport, the first day began with introductions from the team and a much, much needed coffee.

The official programme started shortly thereafter with a very pleasant, albeit sobering surprise – a live performance by Belarusian music ensemble “Volny Chor”. This caught me off guard as the performers had to hide their faces due to fears of political persecution. While the atmosphere turned heavy, I suddenly felt in a much more familiar environment. The next two days would continue to highlight the many challenges facing our region. Notable journalists from the Eastern Neighbourhood, like Ukrainska Pravda’s Sevgil Musaieva and DW’s own Anna Chaika, voiced their concerns over freedom of expression in the region in light of Russia’s war. Musaieva’s description of the war as “the war for the truth” resonated with me as someone coming from a country – Bulgaria – where the battle with disinformation is still ongoing.

“You do remember what Russia said, that Bucha is staged, it’s faked. This is when the battle for the truth began,” she said during her panel discussion on war reporting. This battle was a prominent topic during these two days, resonating with journalists from all over the world. A quote that really stuck with me was by Katharina Nocun, a Polish-German publicist who said: “The role of objective journalism isn’t to give Russia’s narrative a space.” This is a struggle I have... The past year has been very difficult for journalists in Europe, both in Ukraine and in the EU. The level of disinformation being spread online has been hard to comprehend.

I started writing more on politics and society in the region, especially regarding my own country, where disinformation is rampant. Seeing Eastern Europe being brought up so often despite the global nature of the forum really made me realise that the struggle of our journalists is not being ignored. Their work is more important now than ever. Europe is strengthening its collective defence in response to escalating disinformation, sabotage, and cyberattacks. But military measures alone are insufficient. Our strongest defence lies in resilient democracies.

Traditional warfare evokes imagery of trenches and air raids. But Europe’s contemporary reality is very different. Since February 2022, NATO members have been targeted by more than 150 attacks, from cyberattacks that disrupted train schedules to failed assassination and terrorism plots. This new “hybrid” warfare doesn’t begin with conquest, but with chaos. It blurs fact and fiction, aiming to erode public trust through disinformation and sabotage. Its goal: weakening democracy.

In this new landscape, states like Russia are employing ‘sharp power’ techniques to project their influence, through spreading propaganda and mass confusion. Such hybrid threats to the European way of life require hybrid responses. While rebuilding Europe’s physical capacity to protect itself is key, we must also strengthen our democratic foundations to respond to modern threats. When the €800B ReArm Europe Plan launched in March, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared we are now in “an era of rearmament”. The plan’s five part framework focuses on members strengthening their defence capabilities through finance, research and development and new factories. In a conventional threat landscape, this would be enough.But that is not the moment we are in.

One tool at our disposal is tackling disinformation. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume 11, Article number: 101 (2024) Cite this article As social media is a key conduit for the distribution of disinformation, much of the literature on disinformation in elections has been focused on the internet and global social media platforms. Literature on societal and media trust has also grown in recent years. Yet, disinformation is not limited to global platforms or the internet, traditional media outlets in many European countries act as vehicles of disinformation often under the direction of the government. Moreover, the connection between trust and resilience to disinformation has been less discussed.

This article is aimed at tackling the question of what makes a country vulnerable to or resilient against online disinformation. It argues that a society’s information resilience can be viewed as a combination of structural characteristics, features of its knowledge-distribution institutions including its media system, and the activities and capabilities of its citizens. The article makes this argument by describing these dimensions in four European case countries, based on comparable statistics and document analyses. The results indicate that European-wide strategies do not uniformly strengthen national resilience against disinformation and that anti-disinformation strategies need to be anchored in targeted assessments of the state of information resilience at the national... Such assessments are central, particularly to understanding citizens’ information needs in key democratic events such as elections. Defined as purposely created false content, disinformation has been one of the most urgent political problems worldwide in the past decade.

The Battle For Truth How European Nations Are Fighting Disinformation

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