Quantum Safe Transition Advances Cybersecurity Mapping Twelve Actor

The looming threat of quantum computing necessitates a rapid transition to quantum-safe cryptographic systems, as today’s encrypted data becomes vulnerable to future decryption. Ailsa Robertson, Siân Brooke, and Sebastian De Haro, alongside Christian Schaffner, all from Universiteit van Amsterdam and QuSoft, investigate the complex landscape of this crucial transition. Their research delivers a comprehensive, system-level mapping of the actors, influence pathways, and governance responsibilities shaping the move to quantum-safe cryptography, identifying critical gaps in ownership and coordination. This work, stemming from an expert workshop, moves beyond technical solutions to address the social and governance challenges inherent in securing digital infrastructure against the quantum threat, offering insights applicable to national contexts worldwide. This research comprehensively analyses the Dutch national innovation system for quantum-safe cryptography (NISQSCN), examining the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of various actors involved in the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The core argument is that understanding both the formal and interpretative roles of these actors, how they actually behave, their motivations, and the dynamics of power, is crucial for a successful transition.

This moves beyond simply defining who should do what, to understanding how things get done and why. The analysis is grounded in the framework of National Innovation Systems, which views innovation as a complex process involving multiple actors and relationships. The research identifies twelve key actor groups, including Branch, Consulting and Advisory, End Users, Financiers, Manufacturers, Network Ops, Promoters, Regulators, Research and Education, Standards, and Supervisors. Each actor possesses both formal and interpretative roles; for example, Regulators set regulation and mandate interoperability, but also exert influence with standardization bodies. The study highlights that interpretative roles, the actual behaviours and motivations, often outweigh formal roles in determining success. A comprehensive systems analysis, focus on interpretative roles, practical implications for policymakers, and clear organisation are key strengths of the paper.

The research acknowledges potential limitations, including a lack of detailed methodology and limited empirical evidence, and notes that the analysis is specific to the Netherlands. However, it provides a valuable contribution to the literature on innovation systems and cybersecurity, offering nuanced insights into the challenges and opportunities involved in the transition to post-quantum cryptography. This study pioneers a novel approach to understanding the transition to quantum-safe cryptography, moving beyond technical assessments to examine the socio-institutional landscape. Researchers conducted an expert workshop in Amsterdam, leveraging insights from twelve key actor groups to develop a socially informed vision for a quantum-safe future. The methodology centres on a qualitative, iterative focus group design, enabling researchers to elicit stakeholder insights and refine analytical frameworks. This facilitated a deep understanding of policy coordination failures constraining the Dutch innovation system, revealing several responsibilities with unclear ownership.

The study integrates technically informed perspectives into its social scientific analysis, enabling effective communication and engagement with stakeholders. This involved detailed explanations of cryptographic systems, quantum properties, and the potential impact of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). Researchers defined Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC) as encompassing all cryptographic methods expected to withstand both classical and quantum attacks, with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a major subset. This comprehensive approach frames the cryptographic transition as an innovation-system challenge, revealing how agency, expertise, and institutional coordination collectively shape societal readiness for the quantum threat. Quantum-safe Transition Advances Cybersecurity, Mapping Twelve Actor Groups for Future Resilience This research identifies key actors and clarifies governance responsibilities within the complex transition to quantum-resistant cryptography, revealing a need for coordinated action to... #quantum #quantumcomputing #technology https://lnkd.in/e7r7gNkB

Aug 20, 2025 | Amy Hogan-Burney - CVP, Customer Security & Trust Quantum computing promises significant breakthroughs in medicine, material sciences, and beyond. As technology advances, our approach to cybersecurity must also evolve. The emergence of quantum technology introduces new opportunities but also new risks—especially to the security of information. To protect sensitive data and maintain public trust in the digital systems that support our economies and societies, governments must facilitate a cryptographic transition before quantum computers become widely available. Today, Microsoft announced its Quantum Safe Program Strategy—a significant step in preparing for the quantum computing era with a security-first mindset.

Microsoft’s strategy outlines how we aim to enable early adoption of quantum-safe capabilities in our products and services by 2029 and fully transition by 2033—two years ahead of most governments’ transition completion timelines. For decades, encryption algorithms have protected everything from personal passwords and private communications to the critical infrastructure that supports the global financial system. However, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could one day render some encryption methods obsolete, threatening the confidentiality and integrity of data that underpins our digital lives. Although experts predict that such quantum capabilities may not emerge until the 2030s, the need to transition to quantum-safe cryptography is immediate and cannot be delayed. This transition is complex as well as time- and resource-intensive, and organizations that do not act now could soon find their most sensitive information vulnerable. arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

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While quantum computers are expected to help solve some of the world’s most complex problems, they also pose a risk to traditional cryptographic systems, particularly public-key encryption. To ensure their organization’s data remains secure now and in the future, chief information security officers (CISOs) should educate themselves about quantum computing, proactively address the coming quantum risks to cybersecurity and work to... A future cryptographically relevant quantum computer may be able to break public-key algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), leaving sensitive information vulnerable to... Even today, data not protected with quantum-safe cryptography is at risk of being stolen and stored until it can be decrypted. These are commonly called “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks. Standards bodies worldwide have begun guiding the transition to quantum-safe cryptography — encryption algorithms based on math problems considered difficult for even a mature quantum computer to solve.

In 2022, after a six-year-long submission and review process, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected four quantum-resistant algorithms for standardization, three of which were contributed by IBM researchers and partners. Recent guidance from NIST, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) recommends that organizations create a quantum-readiness roadmap for transitioning to these standards, which NIST expects to publish... While every organization, guided by its CISO, should create its own quantum-readiness roadmap, three steps are critical for every organization to undertake to become quantum-safe: Quside - Carlos Abellan | CEO; Deloitte - Colin Soutar | Managing Director, Global Quantum Cyber Readiness Leader; Thales – Blair Canavan | Director, Alliances - PKI & PQC Portfolio New Cryptography Inventory Tool, Quantum-Optimized Firewalls and PAN-OS 12.1 Enable Quantum Readiness The cybersecurity landscape is rapidly shifting due to a risk that’s quietly brewing in the background: the race to achieve quantum supremacy.

Quantum computing has long promised to redefine what’s possible in technology, with its ability to solve complex problems exponentially faster than classical computers. This technological breakthrough promises many benefits likely to unlock trillions in economic value but will also introduce major new risks to the cryptographic foundations of modern cybersecurity. Despite this significance, quantum is still often dismissed as a problem too far away to worry about. That’s changing with the convergence of AI and quantum computing. Researchers are now leveraging AI to reduce some of the key barriers to quantum computing, like automating qubit error correction and optimizing quantum algorithms. This means cryptographically relevant quantum computing (CRQC) – the point at which quantum systems can break today’s public key cryptography – could arrive sooner than the industry initially projected.

McKinsey (2024) predicted a CRQC could break the most common public-key encryption algorithms as soon as 2027, while Gartner (2025) predicts that most conventional asymmetric cryptography would be unsafe to use by 2029. Governments around the world have taken notice, developing new national quantum readiness strategies, including requirements to migrate to new quantum resistant Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) standards, like those developed by the United States National Institute... Organizations are also experimenting with solutions beyond PQC migration, adopting technologies like Quantum Random Number Generation (QRNG) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) to build additional resilience to unforeseen computational advancements. These emerging quantum readiness strategies have another common thread: emphasizing the critical role technology providers can play to proactively lead in the quantum era. At Palo Alto Networks, we’re meeting this moment by announcing a comprehensive suite of new quantum security capabilities as part of PAN-OS 12.1 Orion and our new quantum-optimized fifth-generation Next-Generation Firewalls (NGFW). These capabilities will empower organizations globally, across government and critical infrastructure, to accelerate their quantum readiness in alignment with emerging global and regional standards.

Here is how our new capabilities can help your organization meet some of the fundamental imperatives of quantum readiness:

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